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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE THE MATTER
OF

CASE NUMBER 16853

NELDA BOYER

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
In its Anlicus Curiae Brief, the State concedes
that involuntary guardianship limits the ward's fundamental
civil rights, Amicus Curiae Brief of State of Utah at 5, but
argues that both the substantive and procedural provisions
found in the Utah Uniform Probate Code fully comport with
constitutional mandates.

Appellant vigorously disagrees.

Under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, Utah Code
Ann. §§75-1-101 et seq., an "incapacitated person means any
person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age,
chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause
(except minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions
concerning his person," §75-1-201 (18), allowing the court
to appoint a guardian "if it is satisfied that the person ... is
incapacitated and that the appointment is necessary or desirable
as a means of providing continuing care and supervision .... "
§75-5-304 (emphasis added).
the court, the guardian:

Unless specifically modified by

has custody of the ward and establishes

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the ward's place of residence, §75-5-312(1) (a); has the
right to define the ward's training and educational needs,
id. at (1) (b)

i

determines the ward's need for medical and

other professional care, id. at (1) (c); and in general "has
the same powers, rights, and duties respecting his ward that
a parent has respecting his unemancipated minor child .... "
Id. at (1).

According to the Utah Constitution, Art. IV §6:

"No mentally incompetent person ... unless restored to civil
rights, shall be permitted to vote at any election, or be
eligible to hold office in this State."

While no Utah case

has construed the effect of the appointment of a guardian
with respect to this constitutional provision, see, e.g.,
Home Town Finance Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d
72, 75-76 (1962), it is clear that the appointment of a
guardian results in a massive curtailment of liberties for
the ward.
The controlling principle against which the guardianship
provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code must be measured
was well stated by this Court in In the Matter of the Guardianship
of Valentine, 4 Utah 2d 355, 294 P.2d 696, 702 (1956):
The right of every individual to handle his
own affairs even at the expense of dissipating his fortune is a right jealously
guarded and one which will not be taken away
except in extreme cases.
Like Valentine, Appellant alleges that on the
facts the appointment of a guardian for her was clearly
erroneous.

Unlike Valentine, however, she also challenges

the constitutional validity of the cited statutes, which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fail to comport with the mandates of both procedural and
substantive due process as well as equal protection.
As a case of first impression in this Court,
Appellant asks that the Court consider her allegations of
factual error and constitutional insufficiency as hinging
upon one another.

While Appellant requests a reversal of

the order appointing a guardian for her on every ground this
Court deems appropriate, the Court will recognize that the
factual errors in this case are based in large part upon
statutes that operate to unnecessarily deprive individuals of
their fundamental rights.

The number of future appeals by

others can be substantially diminished through the legislative
enactment of guardianship laws which safeguard these rights.
This Court has before it the opportunity to define the
contours of constitutionality for subsequent enactments of
the Utah Legislature relating to involuntary guardianship.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
Under Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(18), an incapacitated
person must be unable to make "responsible decisions concerning
his person."

(emphasis added)

The statute does not require

that the alleged incapacitated person be unable to make any
decisions, but only that such decisions as are made evidence
a lack of responsibility.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This Court has specifically discarded "an unwillingness
to or lack of interest in functioning, be the latter two
ever so reprehensible as personal characteristics," In Re Heath,
102 Utah 1, 126 P.2d 1058, 1061 (1942), as sufficient grounds
for the appointment of a guardian.

Yet the objective "responsible

decision" standard would permit the appointment of a guardian
for a functional person who makes decisions that pose no
danger to anyone, including self, but are simply labelled
"irresponsible" by others.
An objective standard is inappropriate for determining whether an individual is incapable
of managing his person. Assessing an individual's
personal management by comparing his behavior
to normative standards carries the danger that
courts will assert unnecessary control over the
individual whose behavior is merely different
from that of the majority. This danger is not
a conjectural one.
Recently, parents in several
states have used conservatorship laws to legally
abduct an adult son or daughter who has chosen to
live with an unorthodox religious sect.
"Deprogramming" procedures then divorce these individuals from their religious beliefs. Used in
this manner, conservatorship may function as a
weapon against those who reject conformity rather
than as a service for those who need protection.
Furthermore, because the objective standard
compares the alleged incompetent's personal management to ostensibly desirable personal management
of a reasonable man, the standard tempts the trier
of fact to prescribe what is "best" for an alleged
incompetent even though that individual is capable of making decisions for himself.
In affirming a conservatorship order, one state supreme
court, for example, relied in part on expert
testimony declaring that the best interests of .
the alleged incompetent would be served by appointing a conservator, although the same expert
testified that the alleged incompetent was able
to decide what he did or did not desire.
[In Re
Schmidt's Guardianship, 221 Or. 535, 352 P.2d 152

(1960)]
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Note, Conservatorship of the Person, 1977 U. ILL. L. FORUM
1113, 1121-22.

While Appellant agrees with the State that

guardianship is intended to confer benefits rather than
extinguish rights, Amicus Brief, supra at 13,
[e]xperience should teach us to be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purposes are beneficient ....
The greatest dangers of liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, wellmeaning but without understanding.
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 479

(1938)

(Brandeis, J.,

dissenting) .
The "responsible decision" standard is not only
"inappropriate," Conservatorship of the Person, supra, but
constitutionally impermissible because it is vague.

The

difficulty with a vague standard is that "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application [which] violates the first
essential of due process of law." ·State v. Packard, 122
Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561, 563

(1952).

A statutory standard

must "be susceptible of uniform interpretation and application
by those charged with responsibility of applying and enforcing
it. " Id. , 2 5 0 P. 2d at 5 6 4.
"The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further
aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates
to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively
protected by the Constitution."
U.S. 360, 372 (1964).

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377

Appellant specifically lost the

rights to establish a residence of her choosing and to set
her own educational goals, Utah Code Ann. §75-5-312, both
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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rights jealously guarded as "essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness .... "

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

572 (1972) , and cases cited therein.
The appointment of a guardian labels a person
"irresponsible," if not wholly incompetent to manage one's
affairs. A guardian is appointed for an indefinite period
and during that period has the authority to establish the
ward's need for medical or psychiatric treatment.

In the

context of civil commitment, the State has been constitutionally
required to determine that persons are not only mentally ill
and "unable to engage in a rational decision-making process,"
but also dangerous, before imposing involuntary treatment.
Utah Code Ann. §64-7-36(10); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court,
469 F. Supp. 424 (D.Utah 1979).

While commitment can also

be for an indefinite period of time, a civilly committed
patient can be released from involuntary treatment by mental
health facility staff, §§64-7-42 and 43, whereas an order of
guardianship cannot be modified or vacated except by the
court.

§75-5-307.
In light of this analogy, it is apparent that the

appointment of a guardian is as onerous as civil commitment,
yet a guardian is appointed merely because the ward is
unable to make or communicate "responsible decisions concerning
his person," and because the court is convinced a guardian
is desirable as one means of providing "continuing care and
supervision."

Prior to 1979, Utah's civil commitment laws

contained this same defect.

The Utah federal court's Chief

Judge wrote:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

[T]he statute refers to "a responsible decision." This standard is sufficiently vague
and overbroad to allow for a great deal of abuse.
The use of the word "responsible" focuses the
committing authority's attention on the content
,of the decision rather than on the ability of
the individual to engage in a rational decisionmaking process. The word "responsible," being
given no further content, lends itself to a completely subjective and, therefore, potentially
arbitrary and nonuniform, evaluation of what is
decided rather than an objective evaluation of
the method by which the decision is reached.
Colyar, supra at 433

(original emphasis).

The court noted

that under this standard a particular state court judge was
free to determine whether or not a decision was "responsible."
The use of a vague standard to find a person
incapacitated and in need of guardianship may once have been
constitutionally permissible, but "times and conditions may
change so that it might be adjudged to be unconstitutional .... "
Stone v. Dept. of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah 1977).
Unless a statute affords freedom from arbitrary action, it
cannot satisfy the requirements of substantive due process.
Mineer v. Bd. of Review of Industrial Conun., 572 P.2d 1364,
1366 (Utah 1977).
POINT II.
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OVERBROAD.
This Court has long recognized that personal
liberty is highly prized:
The right to be free from restraint of one's
person is one of the most fundamental and
cherished of freedoms.
It is the policy of
the law to afford it the highest degree of protection possible consistent with the rights
of others.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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J

Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458, 459

(1962).

Where

"the rights of others" are as minimal as they are here, "the
highest degree of protection" is all the more applicable.
Legislation is unconstitutionally overbroad when
it is susceptible to prohibiting conduct protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
292, 153 P.2d 647, 652
829 (1945).

State v. Barlow, 107 Utah

(1944), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S.

Even if the "responsible decision" standard

were clear and precise, a valid use of the State's parens
patriae authority may not sweep unnecessarily broadly to
appoint guardians for functional persons.

v. Keota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).

Cf. Zwickler

Where fundamental and

cheri~hed

freedoms are at stake, the State must employ the least
drastic means available, most especially where the paramount
concern is for the person of the ward.

Shelton v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479 (1960).
The State argues that Utah's guardianship laws are
not overbroad because of the flexibility allowed a court in
determining the powers of a guardian.
at 10.

Amicus Brief, supra

Appellant agrees that flexibility is appropriate,

but, even so, she maintains that these statutes fail to
comport with the principles cited above, for two reasons.
First, whatever flexibility is afforded a court is dependent
upon a finding that the proposed ward is unable to make or
communicate responsible decisions, a threshold too uncertain
and flimsy to afford adequate protection.

The provision for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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finding the appointment "desirable" adds nothing.

While Appellant

agrees that incapacity may stem from myriad causes which cannot
all be statutorily defined, §75-1-201(18), by listing specific
reasons for incapacity yet allowing for "other cause," provides
a court no additional guidance as to the level of impairment
necessary for appointment of a guardian.

For insofar as

Utah's guardianship scheme fails to limit deprivations of
autonomy according to the proposed ward's proven needs, the
scheme violates the least restrictive alternative principle 0
and must be struck down.

See infra at Point III.

Second, the existence and/or sufficiency of particular
dispositions available to the court is not at issue in this
case.

The legislature may provide for flexibility in sentencing

criminal defendants, for example, yet the elements of the
offense charged are set according to rigorous standards.
The same is true in cases of civil commitment and deprivation
of parental rights.

The informality of such proceedings as

these does not permit the abridgement of basic constitutional
provisions of due process.

State in the Interest of S-J-, 576

J

P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978).
In examining the constitutionality of the guardianship
laws, this Court recognizes it is "not primarily concerned
with the wisdom, desirability or expediency of the law, but
with the question as to whether it violates constitutional
guarantees." Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 110 P.2d 355,
363 (1941).

The fact that the proposed ward may be incapacitated

and in need of "continuing care and supervision," Utah Code
Ann. §75-5-304, is insufficient reason to force the person
to accept
a guardian.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It might be argued that the individual
interest is less fundamental or less important when one is dealing with a person of
diminished capacity because the person lacks
the ability to make meaningful choices.
If the
individual interest is less fundamental, then, the
argument goes, the state's interest may be less
compelling.
But this argument sweeps too broadly.
Whether an interest is fundamental depends not
on the depth of individual appreciation of the
interest at stake, but on whether or not the right
is protected by the Constitution.
San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
30-34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973);
"Developments [in the Law, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill," 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,] supra
at 1211 n. 6 .
.... An individual's diminished capacity should
not and does not affect the protection owed him
when the state attempts to deprive him of his
liberty.
Colyar, supra at 430.
Not only does the ward lose the right to make
residential, occupational, educational, and other basic
decisions; further, the guardian's control may violate the
ward's free exercise of religious beliefs.

In Holmes v.

Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D.Ill.
1972), the court held:
The state-appointed conservator's ordering of
medical treatment in violation of his religious
beliefs, no matter how well-intentioned the conservator may be, violates the First Amendment's freedom of exercise clause in the absence of some substantial state interest.
If the definition of incapacitated person for whom
a guardian may be appointed is overbroad, some narrowlydefined class of persons for whom guardians can constitutionally
be appointed must exist.

compare the Utah definitions with

those used in the Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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prepared by the American Bar Association's Commission on the
Mentally Disabled, reprinted at 3 MENTAL DIS. L. REP. 264,
266-67

(1979):

Section 3.
Definitions
As used in this act:
(2) "Disabled persons" means adults whose
ability to receive and evaluate information
effectively and/or to communicate decisions is
impaired to such an extent that they lack the
capacity to manage their financial resources and/
or to meet essential requirements for their
physical health or safety even with courtordered assistance or the appointment of a limited
personal guardian or limited conservator.
(4) "Meet essential requirements for physical health or safety" means those actions necessary to provide the health care, food, shelter,
clothing, personal hygiene and other care without
which serious physical injury or illness is more
likely than not to occur.
(Because the case at bar contests only Utah's laws for
guardianship of the person, the separate sections defining
lack of capacity to "manage financial resources"--provisions
for conservatorship of the estate--are omitted.)
Utah's definition of incapacity contains none of
the requirements of the Model Act that the proposed ward
pose a danger to self.

Utah Code Ann. §75-5-304 does require

that the court find the appointment of a guardian "necessary
or desirable as a means of providing continuing care and
supervision of the person of the incapacitated person," but
a lack of care and supervision need not rise to the level of
personal dangerousness.

Nor does the present statute require

that the appointment of a guardian be the only means of
providing care and supervision.
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The concept that a person must pose a danger to
self before a compelling State interest in intervention
arises has received a fair amount of judicial

atten~ion.

If an individual is able to provide basic
care for himself and is not otherwise a danger
to himself or others, the legitimacy of the state's
interest is called into serious question. The
parens patriae power is premised on the state's
interest in caring for those who cannot care for
themselves.
If an individual can care for himself, alone or with the help of family or friends,
the rationale behind the parens patriae power
fails.
Colyar, supra at 431; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1976); Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).

And

In Re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C.Ct. App. 1979), held that the
guardian of even an adjudicated incompetent person could not
freely make decisions affecting the ward absent a life-ordeath situation.
In sum, the present Utah statutes broadly apply to
allow the appointment of a guardian for persons, like Appellant,
who pose no danger to anyone, including themselves, but who
make decisions that others consider inappropriate.

In this

respect the District Court's decision fully complied with an
unconstitutional statutory scheme:

the facts adduced at the

hearing permitted guardianship over a person capable of
managing her own affairs.

Her decisions might be irresponsible

to some, yet individual choice is determined not by "the
vote of the majority," but by "the singular situation viewed
from the unique perspective of the person called on to make
the decision."

Saikewicz, supra, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
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POINT III.
THE STATUTES FAIL TO REQUIRE APPLICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF LEAST
RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE.
In the context of civil commitment, a Utah court
must find a person:
or others,

(1) mentally ill,

(2) dangerous to self

(3) unable to engage in a rational decision-

making process regarding hospitalization,

(4) can receive

adequate and appropriate treatment in a mental health facility,
and (5) cannot be effectively helped by a less restrictive
alternative, before ordering the person hospitalized.
Code Ann. §64-7-36(10}.

Utah

Once the order of hospitalization

is entered, however, mental health facility staff have
complete flexibility to formulate treatment plans that meet
the patient's needs.
In guardianship proceedings, all dispositions flow
from findings of irresponsible decisionmaking and the desirability
of guardianship.

Moreover, under §75-5-312, the guardian's

authority is automatically plenary, "except as modified by
the court."

However, the statutes nowhere require that

different findings be made for alternative dispositions.
Even if a person is completely unable to engage in a rational
decision-making process, that person is not civilly committable
on those grounds alone; yet that same person can suffer the
deprivations of guardianship for failure to engage in responsible
decisionmaking--and nothing else.

The proposed ward's

individual level of need for guardianship in specific areas
need not be scrutinized under the present Utah law.
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Appellant does not suggest that the criteria for
appointment of a guardian should be identical to those for
civil commitment.

Appellant does maintain that the scope of

the guardian's authority must be both compelled and limited
strictly by the necessity for depriving the ward of autonomy
in those areas.
The American Bar Association, which originally
approved the Uniform Probate Code in 1969, has issued a
statement of the Code's shortcomings.

The ABA now believes

that the Code lacks a number of essential elements:
(1) Assessment of actual mental and adaptive limitations of the person needing assistance or protection.
(2) Court finding of lack of capacity
to do specific kinds of tasks or to make specific kinds of decisions.
(3) Court order of limited guardianship which
specifies those legal disabilities to be imposed and grants only those powers the guardian
will need in order to act where a legal disability
has been specified.
ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Limited Guardianships
for the Mentally Disabled, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE RE,V. 231, 232

(1978).
Guardianship laws must require application of the
least restrictive alternative for at least two reasons.
First is the broad range of factual contexts
to which the principle has been applied. · The
doctrine itself, as generally enunciated by
the Supreme Court, seems broad enough to encompass any situation in which fundamental personal
liberties are infringed upon by government regulations promulgated in pursuit of legitimate state
objectives.
Second, the concept has already
been applied in cases involving the analogous
situation of the involuntary institutionalization
and habilitation of the mentally disabled.
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Comment, Interdiction Reform: The Need for a Limited Interdiction
Article in the Louisiana Civil Code, 54 TULANE L. REV. 164,
184 (1979).

The article concludes that the extension of the

least restrictive alternative principle to guardianship
proceedings is constitutionally required.
POINT IV.
A HIGH EVIDENTIARY STANDARD DOES NOT
CURE SUBSTANTIVE DEFECTS.
Appellant agrees with the State that the "satisfaction"
standard of proof is equated with the standard of clear and
convincing evidence.

Amicus Brief, supra atlB-19.

However,

the State's averment that "the individual is protected from
any possible vagueness in definition by the requirement that
the judge must be presented with clear and convincing evidence"
is blatently incorrect.

This same allegation was raised in

Colyar, supra at 433, where the relevant standard of proof
was beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the State's argument is

persuasive here, it should have been all the more persuasive
where the standard was even higher.

But the court said:

The defendant urges that any ambiguity
in the statute is cured by the fact that the
state must prove all the statutory elements
beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard of
proof is a stringent one, and does work to
provide protection for the person facing involuntary commitment.
The protection afforded
is, however, from the risk of factual error,
not from the risk of commitment under an overly
broad or unduly vague statute.
In Re Ballay
[ 15 7 u. s. App. D. c. 5 9 I 4 8 2 F. 2d 6 4 8 , ] 6 5 0
[(1973)].
The statute does provide that a person
not be committed unless the state shows beyond
a reasonable doubt that he can be validly confined.
However, the statute does not make sufficiently
precise the criteria by which a state can validly
commit.
If it is not clear what has to be
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or if what must
be proven is too broad in character, the standard
of proof applied is irrelevant. No matter how
high the standard, the due process problem of
what must be proven remains.
POINT V.
STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY APPLIES.
The State argues that strict judicial scrutiny of
the statutory criteria need not be applied by this Court but
only by claiming that "the Utah involuntary guardianship
statute can pass even the strict scrutiny test ...

[so that]

there is no question that the Utah statute is not [sic]
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose."
Brief, supra at 9.

Amicus

The State admits that restrictions on

basic personal rights demand strict scrutiny, id. at 8, but
then curiously considers only the "suspect class" basis for_)
strict scrutiny and concludes that because the class of
involuntary wards is not one usually labelled "suspect" by
the United States Supreme Court, that Court would not apply
strict scrutiny.

Both the State and Appellant agree that

fundamental rights are at stake in involuntary guardianship
proceedings.

When:

[T]he classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that [fundamental] right, we believe that "critical
examination" of the state interests advanced in
support of the classification is required.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383

(1978)

(overturning

Wisconsin's requirement that an ex-spouse guarantee the
continuance of child support obligations before being allowed
to remarry).

The State's citation to Trimble v. Gordon,430

U.S. 762
(1977),
is inapposite
there
neither
was
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class of illegitimate children "suspect," nor were fundamental
rights implicated.
This Court has already recognized the necessity
for strict judicial scrutiny when basic personal liberties
are at stake.

Mildon, supra.

Strict scrutiny calls for the

State to show a compelling interest in the guardianship
statutes as written.

See Zablocki, supra.

When the statutes

reasonably assure that no individual will be unnecessarily
deprived of fundamental liberties, then the factfinding of
individual guardianship proceedings will comport with constitutional
mandates.
CONCLUSION
As the State cannot now show that proper application of the Utah statutes will result in the appointment of
guardians for only those persons who require protection
because dangerous and bereft of mental capacity, the statutory
scheme must fail.
DATED this

cv

day of

~&J.

---=-----

'

1980.
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